WILSONIAN DOCTRINE & SEPARATION OF POWERS: A COMPARATIVE
REFLECTION OF THE RATIFICATION DEBATE

Benjamin Gilberg*
The separation of powers is a staple of liberty and American
republicanism, and “the primary organizational principle” of the United States
Constitution.1 At the time of the ratification debate, Federalists and
Antifederalists quarreled over the proper application of this framework
to American society. For the Federalists, the three most significant voices were
arguably two authors of The Federalist, James Madison and Alexander
Hamilton, and James Wilson, the leader of the debate in Pennsylvania and
one of the most active delegates of the Convention. While they disagreed
profusely on many areas of governance, all three subscribed to a common,
unifying notion: a stronger national government can be formed without
threatening liberty.2 All three thinkers also accepted the idea of the sovereignty
of the people as a basis for abandoning the Articles of Confederation and
forming a new government.3 The Antifederalist side, however, thought that
the Constitution was deficient in part because it failed to truly realize the
concept of separate and distinct sources of authority.4
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Id. (discussing how Alexander Hamilton’s perceptions of popular sovereignty were similar but more
attenuated than that of James Wilson). Wilson’s political philosophy, to a large extent, orbited
around this concept of sovereignty. While modern understanding of Hamiltonian thought suggests
that the idea of sovereignty was more of a legitimizing principle than anything else, Wilson saw it as
much more. See id. at 90 (noting while both Hamilton and Wilson were strong nationalists, Wilson
was more democratic, as he deemed the people to be superior to both the state and federal
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DURING THE STRUGGLE OVER RATIFICATION 49 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993) [hereinafter THE
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The principle of the separation of powers predates the ratification of the
Constitution in American political thought. Even before the 1787
Convention, the separation of powers was crucial to the formation of state
governments in Virginia, Maryland, and North Carolina.5 Article VI of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights of 1776, for example, provided “[t]hat the
legislative, executive and judicial powers of government, ought to be forever
separate and distinct from each other.”6 The principle was also a common
tool for pointing out the defects of the Articles of Confederation. In 1783, for
instance, Alexander Hamilton, in drafting a resolution calling for a convention
to amend the Articles of Confederation, referred to the governing document–
–particularly the broad authority granted to the unicameral legislature by the
Articles––as “contrary to the most approved and well founded maxims of free
government which require that the legislative executive and judicial authorities
should be deposited in distinct and separate hands.”7
Unlike the Virginia, Maryland, and North Carolina constitutions, the
Federal Constitution of 1787 did not explicitly enshrine the separation of
powers principle.8 Rather, the legislative, executive, and judicial branches as
we understand them today were separated as a functional result of the manner
in which the different powers were delegated by the Framers. While the
application of separation of powers is clear from the Constitution, the
governing document itself does not provide clear guidance on the convention
delegates’ understanding of the doctrine in theory.
This Article explores the separation of powers principle as understood by
different sides and players of the debate. The mainstream positions of the
Federalists and Antifederalists are of course the most obvious schism in
viewpoint. This Article will survey the differing treatments of the principle of
separation of powers in The Federalist and by key opponents of the
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DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION] (advising that the “[l]egislative [and] executive [d]epartments
should be entirely distinct [and] independent”) (emphasis added).
Matthew P. Bergman, Montesquieu’s Theory of Government and the Framing of the American
Constitution, 18 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 25 (1991); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison)
(referencing the founding documents of these three states to argue that the separation of powers
principle does not require the three branches to be completely separate from one another).
MD. CONST. of 1776, Declaration of Rights, art. VI; see also VA. CONST. of 1776 (“The legislative,
executive, and judiciary department, shall be separate and distinct, so that neither exercise the powers
properly belonging to the other: nor shall any person exercise the powers of [more] than one of them,
at the same time . . . .”).
Alexander Hamilton, Continental Congress Unsubmitted Resolution Calling for a Convention to
Amend the Articles of Confederation, [July 1783], NAT’L ARCHIVES: FOUNDERS ONLINE,
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-03-02-0272.
See generally U.S. CONST. arts. I–III (explaining the functions of the legislative, executive, and
judicial branches).
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Constitution. The concepts of separation and checks have inherent tension
with one another: while Federalists tended to err on the side of more
overlapping powers in the form of checks, Antifederalists wanted a
much greater degree of separation between the departments.9 But there are
notable differences in political thought between the most prominent
defenders of the Constitution as well. James Wilson is one of the most
overlooked Framers, yet he was one of the most impactful voices at the
1787 Convention and during the subsequent ratification debate.10 In an
attempt to rectify this disservice, this Article will also compare Wilson’s
philosophical justification for and application of separation of powers with that
of The Federalist and the Antifederalist ideology. In so doing, it is apparent
that his stances land at different points along the spectrum of the debate.
While Wilson advocated for greater checks (and therefore less separation)
between the branches in some senses, he also believed that some elements of
governance were not separate enough under the 1787 Constitution.
Wilson’s interpretation of separation of powers exemplifies that, although
fundamental in American political thought, the maxim was a point of
contention both between the opposing sides of the ratification debate and
within them.
Elements of the principle are still contested in
modern jurisprudence.11
The principle of separation of powers, as it is understood in American
governance, was handed down by Charles-Louis de Secondat, baron de La
Brède et de Montesquieu.12 A French philosopher and political writer,
9
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See, e.g., Bryan, infra note 58 (warning that the mixture of legislative and executive powers in a single
would create political corruption).
See MARK DAVID HALL, THE POLITICAL AND LEGAL PHILOSOPHY OF JAMES WILSON, 1742–
1798, at 1 (1997) (introducing Wilson as “perhaps the most underrated founder”).
See, e.g., Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R. v. Aurelius Inv., LLC, 140 S. Ct. 1649, 1652 (2020)
(determining that the Appointments Clause, and therefore executive authority, does not govern the
appointment of members to the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico);
Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 911 (2018) (holding that the Gun Lake Trust Land Reaffirmation
Act does not violate separation of powers); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 412 (1989)
(holding that sentencing guidelines are not a violation of the separation of powers principle); Miller
v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 348–49 (2000) (holding that the automatic stay of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act does not violate separation of powers principles); Commodity Futures Trading
Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986) (“When these Article III limitations [such as separation
of powers] are at issue, notions of consent and waiver cannot be dispositive because the limitations
serve institutional interests that the parties cannot be expected to protect.”).
Montesquieu was not the first to articulate or endorse the separation of powers idea. Locke, for
example, had also written in favor of separate executive and legislative powers. See Samuel W.
Cooper, Note, Considering “Power” in Separation of Powers, 46 STAN. L. REV. 361, 363 (1994)
(highlighting Locke’s observation that “‘well-ordered common-wealths’ separated legislative and
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Montesquieu inspired the fundamental notions of government that gave birth
to the structure of American republicanism. The idea that government should
be decentralized among three sources of authority is one of the most
celebrated principles today and during the time of the Founding. Advocates
on both sides of the Constitution admired and cited Montesquieu regularly to
support their conclusions. During the American Founding and beyond, many
regarded his contribution to Enlightenment thought as the “greatest
achievement of modern political philosophy.”13
Montesquieu’s The Spirit of the Laws introduced the idea of classifying
government into distinct categories of power, namely the executive, judicial,
and legislative powers. In Montesquieu’s view, this separation is crucial to the
preservation of liberty, which requires that “government be [structured such]
that one man need not be afraid of another.”14 If the legislative and executive
powers were combined under a single authority, for instance, there can be no
liberty because that entity can “enact tyrannical laws, to execute them in a
tyrannical manner.”15 Similarly, if the legislative and judicial powers were
combined, then the people’s liberty “would be exposed to arbitrary control,”
and if the judicial power joined with that of the executive, then a “judge
might behave with violence and oppression.”16 In other words, a free society
cannot exist where a “single institution could exert all [of the] power.”17 It
would result in a “despotic sway” and “[t]here would be an end of
everything.”18
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executive powers to assure that those who make the laws also remain subject to them”) (citing JOHN
LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT §§ 134–58 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1980) (1690)).
Montesquieu was, however, the first to emphasize the importance of an independent judiciary, which
would later evolve into the spirit of Hamilton’s The Federalist No. 78 and the idea of judicial review.
See Bergman, supra note 5, at 14 (noting that Montesquieu “popularized the trinity between the
executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government”). Nevertheless, among the strongest
voices during the ratification period, Montesquieu was the most often cited political authority on this
issue. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison) (highlighting Montesquieu); see also
GEORGE THOMAS, THE MADISONIAN CONSTITUTION 18 (2008) (referring to Montesquieu as “the
most cited authority in The Federalist”).
Michael P. Zuckert, The Political Science of James Madison, in HISTORY OF AMERICAN POLITICAL
THOUGHT 153 (Bryan-Paul Frost & Jeffrey Sikkenga eds., 2003).
1 BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 182 (J.V. Prichard ed., Thomas Nugent
trans., 1900) (1748).

Id.
Id.
Edward H. Levi, Some Aspects of the Separation of Powers, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 371, 375 (1976).
1 MONTESQUIEU, supra note 14, at 183.
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During the ratification debate, Federalists and Antifederalists alike found
inspiration in Montesquieu’s writings.19 Both saw their visions of government
as consistent with his principles. Because of their differing views on the
meaning and proper application of republicanism, they used Montesquieu’s
arguments as a premise for different conclusions.
Utilizing
Montesquieu’s republican ideology, for example, Antifederalists argued that
the proposed Constitution would corrupt the “republican character.”20
Montesquieu wrote that, among other circumstances, “[t]he principle of
democracy is corrupted . . . when the spirit of equality is extinct.”21 Many
Antifederalists maintained that by empowering the elite few at the expense of
the masses, the Constitution would corrupt republican virtue in America.22
While the Antifederalists utilized Montesquieu’s republican ideology to a
greater degree than the Federalists, both sides relied on his principle of
separation of powers in framing the debate. Federalists and Antifederalists
alike agreed almost universally that all of the government’s power ought not
be concentrated in a single department or institution.23 The Federalists
contended that this virtue was necessary for an orderly republic and that the
Constitution satisfied this demand.24 But the Antifederalists maintained that
the proposed government failed to put the principle into proper practice and,
therefore, fostered a corrupt and dysfunctional republic that would
eventually spiral into tyranny or aristocracy. Of course, this logically leads to
the conclusion that the Federalists and Antifederalists harbored different
notions of what effective separation of powers entailed. It is apparent from
the arguments that the Antifederalists interpreted The Spirit of the Laws as
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See Abraham Kupersmith, Montesquieu and the Ideological Strain in Antifederalist Thought, in
THE FEDERALISTS, THE ANTIFEDERALISTS, AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION 47
(Wilson Carey McWilliams & Michael T. Gibbons eds., 1992) (exploring the influence of
Montesquieu’s The Spirit of the Laws on Antifederalist thought). See also THE FEDERALIST NO. 47
(James Madison) (referring to Montesquieu as “[t]he oracle who is always consulted and cited on
th[e] subject [of comingling governmental powers]”).
Id. at 58; see also MELANCTON SMITH, THE ANTIFEDERALISTS 388 (Kenyon ed., 1985) (1788).
1 MONTESQUIEU, supra note 14, at 133.
See, e.g., THE ANTIFEDERALIST NO. 47 (Centinel) (arguing that the Senate would serve as an
“aristocratic junto” of which the president would be head); Brutus, Excerpts from Brutus No. 1,
Annotated
(Oct.
18,
1787),
BILL
OF
RTS.
INST.,
https://docs-offreedom.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/document/attachment/440/Brutus_No_1_Excerpts_Annotate
d_Proof_3__1_.pdf (quoting THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS to argue that “[i]t is natural to a republic to
have only a small territory, otherwise it cannot long subsist”).
Referring to the principle of separation of powers, the first paragraph of The Federalist No. 47 opens
by stating that “[n]o political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic value.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 47
(James Madison).

See id.
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But The

I. THE FEDERALIST

The Federalist, one of the most significant writings in American political
history, is one of the most relied upon texts when it comes to constitutional
interpretation. The U.S. Supreme Court affords deference to the essays
regularly in its opinions.25 This explains, in part, the reverence of the
separation of powers principle in relation to American system of government.
When it comes to studying the separation of powers and the role it was meant
to play in American governance, therefore, The Federalist is a wise
starting point.26
One of the primary critiques of the proposed Constitution was that the
three branches of government were not separate enough.27 Publius, the pen
name used by the authors of The Federalist, devoted a significant portion of
the essays to rebutting this proposition. In The Federalist, Madison wrote that
“[t]he accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the
same hands . . . may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”28 He
attributed this principle to “the celebrated Montesquieu,” “[t]he oracle who is

25

26

27
28

See Pamela C. Corley, Robert M. Howard & David C. Nixon, The Supreme Court and Opinion
Content: The Use of the Federalist Papers, 58 POL. RSCH. Q. 329, 329 (“Over the past several
decades many on the Supreme Court have increasingly cited the Federalist Papers in majority,
concurring and dissenting opinions.”).
The reasoning in The Federalist should not necessarily be conflated with Madison and Hamilton’s
preferences for ideal forms of government in all cases. See Zuckert, supra note 13, at 165
(maintaining that an overemphasis on The Federalist has “prevented us from grasping the full scope
or character of the Madisonian political science”). The final product was the result of a multitude of
compromises. No delegate agreed with every aspect of the governing document when the
Convention adjourned in September 1787. Madison’s notes from the Federal Convention reveal
stark differences between what The Federalist authors said behind closed doors and what they
presented for the public’s consideration. For example, on June 4, 1787, Hamilton endorsed
empowering the President with an absolute negative on legislation. See JAMES MADISON, THE
DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 WHICH FRAMED THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 51–52 (Gaillard Hunt & James Brown Scott eds., 1920). However,
in The Federalist No. 73, he praised the virtues of a qualified negative (veto power with the possibility
of override from the Legislature) while warning about the deficiencies of an absolute one. THE
FEDERALIST NO. 73 (Alexander Hamilton).
See Hamilton, supra note 7 (arguing that the Articles of Confederation was contrary to the separation
of powers principle).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison). Madison was writing genuinely when extolling the
virtues of Montesquieu’s principle. On June 17, 1787, at the Convention, he also commented that
the three separate and distinct departments as essential to the preservation of liberty. MADISON,
supra note 26, at 112.
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always consulted and cited on this subject.”29 However, he rejected the
notion that the powers must be separate and distinct in an absolute sense in
order for liberty to be properly safeguarded.30 In citing Montesquieu, Madison
referred to his discussion of the British Constitution. He contended that
Montesquieu viewed the English government as “the mirror of political
liberty,” as he considered it to be the epitome of the separation of powers
principle in operation.31 Madison explained that the British Constitution does
not treat the legislative, executive, and judicial functions as totally separate
from one another.32 Indeed, among other examples, the monarch has the
power to enact legislative acts in the form of treaties with other sovereign
nations, and he can both appoint and remove judges in certain
circumstances.33 On this basis, Madison concluded that the preservation of
liberty, as understood by Montesquieu, did not prohibit one individual or
body from exercising a part of the powers of different governmental functions,
but rather prohibited one from wielding the entirety of multiple departments.34
The Federalist ideology contended that the separation of powers principle
in its purest form is not only unnecessary as reasoned by Montesquieu, but
also harmful to the overall objective of effective and safe governance.35
Because “power is of an encroaching nature,” a “mere demarcation on
parchment,” or constitutionally mandated limits, is not enough alone to
control passions of human nature and prevent power from concentrating in a
single individual or body.36 Instead, the powers of the branches must overlap
to a certain degree in order to prevent abuses of power from the different
departments, particularly from the legislature.37 Accordingly, in Federalist
29
30
31
32
33
34
35

36
37

THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison).

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 66 (Alexander Hamilton) (“[P]artial intermixture [of the executive,
legislative, and judiciary powers] is even, in some cases, not only proper but necessary to the mutual
defense of the several members of the government against each other.”).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison).
In The Federalist No. 48, Madison explains that the legislature is the most prone to overstepping its
authority under the Constitution because it is “less susceptible of precise limits” and “it can, with the
greater facility, mask . . . the encroachments which it makes on the co-ordinate departments.” See
also 1 MONTESQUIEU, supra note 14, at 190 (arguing that the executive should be able to restrain
the legislature but the legislature should not be able to stay the executive because “the execution has
its natural limits” and “it is useless to confine it”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 264–265 (James
Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (explaining that predomination of the legislative
authority necessitates dividing Congress into two separate branches with differing functions and
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Nos. 47 and 48, Madison approaches the argument for quasi separate and
distinct branches of government in two lights. First, he legitimizes the principle
by lining it up with Montesquieu’s vision of what separation of powers ought
to look like.38 And second, he defends its practicality and necessity by pointing
out the dangers that manifest when the safeguards for separate powers merely
consist of an express provision in the Constitution that forbids the intermixing
of the three governments, as we saw with Virginia’s constitution prior to
ratification.39 A middle ground between separate and distinct departments in
its truest sense and the administration of multiple departments by one
individual or body, therefore, was the most effective means of preserving
liberty according to The Federalist.40
For Publius, overlapping powers among the different departments of
government was vital for ensuring that each one is able to maintain “a will of
its own,” thereby preventing government tyranny.41 The discussion in
Federalist Nos. 47 and 48 lays the groundwork for Madison’s conception of
checks and balances, as elaborated upon in Federalist No. 51. The
Federalist’s conception of separate yet partially mixed powers carries over to
other elements of the Constitution discussed in the essays. In addressing the
judiciary, for instance, Hamilton emphasized the need not only for
independent courts, but also for the courts to be able to void legislative acts
that defy the Constitution.42 The separation of powers principle thus played a
crucial role for a number of important aspects of the Federalist pitch.

38
39
40

41
42

modes of elections); THE FEDERALIST NO. 73, at 371 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009)
(acknowledging “[t]he propensity of the legislative department to intrude upon the rights, and to
absorb the powers, of the other departments”).
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (leaning on Montesquieu’s writings to support his conception
separation of powers).
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (arguing that the three branches must not be completely siloed).
Madison’s interpretation of Montesquieu’s separation of powers principle in Federalist No. 48 seems
to be supported by the text. In The Spirit of the Laws 189, Montesquieu explains that “[w]ere the
executive power not to have a right of restraining the encroachments of the legislative body, the latter
would become despotic; for as it might arrogate to itself what authority it pleased, it would soon
destroy all the other powers.” 1 MONTESQUIEU, supra note 14 at 189. This would suggest that
Montesquieu intended for overlap between the departments, possibly to a greater extent than the
Antifederalists would have liked. Even though Federalist No. 48 does not directly mention
Montesquieu or address his work, it is likely that Madison’s apparent distrust of the legislature
compared to the other branches, at least in part, was inspired by The Spirit of the Laws.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (describing the judiciary and judicial review in
the Constitution). Although Montesquieu does not address judicial review, it can be inferred that it
was inspired, at least in part, by The Spirit of the Laws, as it is an inevitable consequence of the
separation of powers principle. Indeed, if there is no remedy for unconstitutional acts then the
system of checks and balances collapses. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)
(establishing judicial review).
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However, not every Federalist would have liked to see it be applied in the
same manner.43
II. THE ANTIFEDERALISTS’ OPPOSITION
The structure of the United States government is designed by the infusion
of two key principles: separation of powers and checks and balances.44 In
explaining how these concepts interact with one another, Edward Millican
observed that these hallmarks, though fundamental, are often quite
contradictory in practice.45 While separation of powers, as understood by The
Spirit of the Laws, the Maryland Declaration of Rights of 1776, and the
Virginia Constitution of 1776 require that the three branches operate under
“separate” and “distinct” spheres (strongly implying that they not “be
subjected to the interference of the other branches”),46 the theory of checks
and balances mandates tension and overlapping powers in order to prevent
governmental institutions from overreaching in violation of the Constitution.
This overlap creates a system of government whereby “institutions that are for
the most part functionally separate may be given a degree of control over the
ordinary duties of the others.”47 Federalists and Antifederalists generally
agreed “that the members of each department should be as little dependent
as possible on those of the others, for the emoluments annexed to their
offices.”48 It appears, however, the split between the Federalists and
Antifederalists on the issue of separation of powers, to a large extent, is the
result of disagreement on the degree of independence that could be
reconciled with durable self-government.
In defending the constitutional system of checks and balances, Hamilton
argued that the “partial intermixture” of the three branches is, in some cases,
“necessary to the mutual defense of the several members of the government
against each other.”49 The Antifederalists, however, believed that this mixture
went too far. While The Federalist maintained that the mixture prescribed by
the Constitution facilitated “control [of] the abuses of government,”50
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50

See 1 WILSON, infra note 117, at 260 (“[T]he powers of the several parts of [the] government are
not kept as distinct and independent as they ought to be.”).
EDWARD MILLICAN, ONE UNITED PEOPLE: THE FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE NATIONAL IDEA
148 (1990).
Id. at 149.

Id.
Id.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 66 (Alexander Hamilton).
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
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Antifederalists argued that it provided certain institutions too much power
among multiple disciplines.51 In other words, they perceived certain mixture
of powers, intended to check the branches, as enabling the
improper accumulation of power by a single body.
Like Montesquieu, the Antifederalists were very suspicious of corruption
and greed.52 As discussed above, Federalist No. 47 defended the allocation of
constitutional powers by pointing out that Montesquieu viewed the British
Constitution as the ideal form of government for the preservation of liberty.
Although The Federalist by no means advocated for a replication of
the English system, the fear of a shift towards overreaching government can be
understood given the fact that the British government consisted of an
aristocratic upper house and monarch that played a significant role in the
legislature.53
The Antifederalists insisted that the proposed Constitution did not adhere
strictly enough to Montesquieu’s vision of separate powers.54 Indeed, contrary
to Federalist Nos. 47 and 48, those that opposed ratification commonly and
strenuously demanded that the separation of the different departments be of
a much greater degree. Less than a month after the 1787 Convention
adjourned, Reverend James Madison wrote to Convention Delegate James
Madison that the “[l]egislative [and] executive [d]epartments should be
entirely distinct [and] independent,” warning that proposed distribution of
power would “threaten [d]estruction to [the] Liberties of
America.”55 However, not every Antifederalist felt that the branches ought to
be totally separated. In his sixteenth essay, Brutus, the pen name of a vocal
Antifederalist, argued that separate and distinct branches in the literal sense
were not feasible. He wrote that, “in some special cases,” it was permissible
to delegate certain executive powers to the legislature.56 But with that said, the

51
52

53
54
55

56

See THE ANTIFEDERALIST NO. 47 (Centinel) (criticizing the proposed Senate as overpowered).
See RALPH KETCHAM, FRAMED FOR POSTERITY: THE ENDURING PHILOSOPHY OF THE
CONSTITUTION 76 (1993) (pointing out the Antifederalist concern about government officials acting
without sufficient restraint).
Zuckert, supra note 13, at 155. Putting this trepidation into the context of the time is important
too, as the Revolution against the abuses of the British government had been in recent memory.
See Bryan, infra note 58 (warning that the mixture of legislative and executive powers in a single
would produce corruption).
Letter from Rev. James Madison to James Madison (Oct. 1, 1787), in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 48, 49 (emphasis added). See also Letter from Joseph Spencer to
James Madison, Enclosing John Leland’s Objections (Feb. 28, 1788), in 2 THE DEBATE ON THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 44, at 267, 269 (expressing the same concern).
Brutus, Brutus XVI, in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST: AN ABRIDGEMENT, BY MURRAY DRY, OF THE
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 103, 191 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1985).
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separation of the departmental powers “should be sought as far as is
practicable.”57
So while there was some disconformity within the
Antifederalist movement regarding the degree of separation that was
appropriate to maintain liberty, there was near universal consensus that the
Federal Constitution had defied Montesquieu’s maxim via over mixing of
powers between branches.
Specifically, Antifederalists feared the broad powers afforded to the
proposed Senate by Article I. The opponents of the new government
vigorously denounced the Senate, fearing that it would serve as an “aristocratic
junto” by conspiring with the President at the expense of the people’s liberty
and sovereignty.58 Many Antifederalists claimed that by being afforded
executive powers over treaties and judicial power to convict impeached
officers, the Senate exercised all three powers of government, thereby
violating the principle of separation of powers.59 Writing under the
pseudonym “A Columbian Patriot,” Mercy Otis Warren expressed alarm
about this mixture, particularly between the legislative and executive
departments.60 He believed that the powers delegated by the Constitution were
“couched in such ambiguous terms—in such vague and ind[e]finite
expression.”61 This can arguably be taken to be a critique of the Federal
Constitution affording too much discretion through obscurity.
Antifederalists warned about the power of the Senate to remove the
President from office, categorizing it as a judicial power. Opponents of the
Constitution alleged that this authority stood in direct contrast to the ability to,
as described by John Dawson, serve as “council to the President.”62 During
the North Carolina Convention, for instance, Samuel Spencer warned that

57
58

59

60
61
62

Id.
THE ANTIFEDERALIST NO. 47 (Centinel); ROHR, supra note 1, at 194; see also Samuel Bryan, Reply
to Wilson’s Speech: “Centinel” II, FREEMAN’S J. (Oct. 24, 1787), reprinted in in 1 THE DEBATE ON
THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 77, 86–87 (warning that providing the Senate with “a
considerable share in the executive as well as legislative” would turn it into “a permanent
aristocracy”). Bryan contended that any sort of mixture between the two departments “highly tends
to corruption” and advocated for their complete separation. Id.
See THE ANTIFEDERALIST NO. 47 (Centinel) (referring to the Senate as an “aristocratic junto”); see
also ROHR, supra note 1, at 194 (referring to the Senate as “a favorite whipping boy of the AntiFederalists”).
“A Columbian Patriot” [Mercy Otis Warren], Observations on the Constitution (Feb. 1788), in 2
THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 284, 290.

Id.
John Dawson’s Fears for the Future (June 24, 1788), in 2 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION,
supra note 4, at 742, 746.
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the Senate should not be able to both advise the President63 and vote to convict
him for impeachment because that would give them the power to remove the
President for doing precisely what the Senate approved him to do.64 The
Senate, in this circumstance, would have too much control over the President,
thereby allowing it to accumulate too much power at the expense of liberty.
The power of trying impeachments also allegedly encouraged corruption by
enabling the Senate to elect not to remove a culpable president in exchange
for some sort of benefit from the executive branch.65 If this is the case, then
presidents would not be held accountable when executing “treasonable
attempts that may be made on the liberties of the people, when instigated by
his coadjutors in the senate.”66 Because the Constitution’s delegation of
powers enabled this kind of corruption, the executive and legislative branches
were deemed by Antifederalists to be “dangerously connected.”67
Antifederalists were additionally concerned that the long duration of
Senate terms and small number of representatives would make it easier for
legislators to conspire with one another, potentially leading to significant
abuses of power.68 Specifically, the Constitution’s opponents feared that the
duration of power and the means of acquiring it intensified the dangers that
came with affording different governmental functions to the same
department.69 In his letter to Edmund Randolph, for example, Richard
Henry Lee pointed out with alarm that merely twenty-seven individuals, the
President, and all the Senators, would be carrying out all of the executive

63

64
65
66
67
68

69

Many Antifederalists considered appointments to be a solely executive power and it was an overreach
to give Congress a share of that authority. Instead, the Pennsylvania Antifederalists preferred that a
small independent council outside of the legislative branch approve presidential appointments with
a majority vote. See Dissent of the Minority of the Pennsylvania Convention (Dec. 18, 1787), in 1
THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 526, 547 (“[T]he supreme executive powers
ought to have been placed in the president, with a small independent council, made personally
responsible for every appointment to office or other act, by having their opinions recorded; and that
without the concurrence of the majority of the quorum of this council, the president should not be
capable of taking any step.”).
Samuel Spencer Objects to the Powers of the Senate and Fears It Will Control the President (July
28, 1788), in 2 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 879, 880.
Dissent of the Minority of the Pennsylvania Convention (Dec. 18, 1787), in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 526, 547.

Id.
Id.
See “An Officer of the Late Continental Army” [William Findley?], Reply to Wilson’s Speech,
INDEP. GAZETTEER (Nov. 6, 1787), reprinted in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra
note 4, at 92, 99–100.
See, e.g., id. at 100 (“Congress are to have the power of fixing the time, place, and manner of holding
elections, so as to keep them forever subjected to their influence.”).
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power and two-thirds of the legislative power.70 He concluded that “either a
monarchy or aristocracy will be generated,” as the Constitution was “highly
and dangerously oligarchic” in form.71 Randolph agreed. In his letter
explaining his reasons for not signing the Constitution while serving as a
delegate at the Convention, he wrote that tyranny is inevitable when “[t]he
legislative and executive [powers] are concentrated in the same persons.”72
Thus, while The Spirit of the Laws and The Federalist repeatedly warn
about the danger of overreach by the legislature (preventing this is the primary
purpose of separation of powers and checks and balances according to
Publius), Antifederalists viewed the overlapping powers afforded to the Senate
as engendering the exact outcome meant to be avoided.73 The debate suggests
that the Federalists and the Antifederalists harbored differing definitions of
what constituted an executive and legislative power,74 and they differed on the
extent that the separation of powers principle should play a role in American
governance. The Antifederalists generally wanted the principle applied in the

70

71

See Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Governor Edmund Randolph (Dec. 6, 1787), in 1 THE
DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 465, 465–66 (describing such a combination of
power as “formidable”); see also Dissent of the Minority of the Pennsylvania Convention (Dec. 18,
1787) in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 526, 546 (arguing that vesting too
much authority to so few representatives would encourage corruption by inducing foreign agents to
bribe government officials, especially with regards to forming treaties with the nations that the agents
represent).
Letter from Richard Henry Lee to Governor Edmund Randolph (Dec. 6, 1787), in 1 THE DEBATE
ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 465, 465–66; see also “Cato” V, Can an American Be a

Tyrant? On the Great Powers of the Presidency, the Vagueness of the Constitution, and the Dangers
of Congress, N.Y.J. (Nov. 22, 1787), reprinted in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra

72

73
74

note 4, at 399, 402 (“[R]epresentation consists of so few; too few to resist the influence of corruption,
and the temptation to treachery, against which all governments ought to take precautions . . . .”).
See Governor Edmund Randolph’s Reasons for Not Signing the Constitution (Dec. 27, 1787), in 1
THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 595, 603 (providing Edmund Randolph’s
letter, dated October 10, 1787, outlining his reasons for refusing to sign the Constitution). The vice
presidency, acting as a bridge between the executive and legislative branches, also produced concern
among Antifederalists for the same reason. Richard Henry Lee, for instance, argued that the vice
presidency undermined the separation of powers principle, explaining that if “[t]he vice president
may be part of the Senate at one period, and act as the supreme executive at another,” then it follows
that “the president is connected with or tied to the Senate.” Richard Henry Lee, in ESSENTIAL
WORKS OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS 277 (Leonard Kriegel ed., 1964).
See THE ANTIFEDERALIST NO. 47 (arguing that the President would be a “mere pageant” and
referring to the Senate as an “aristocratic junto”).
See e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 75 (explaining that the power of entering into treaties does not fall
explicitly under the executive or legislative function, as it pertains to contracts with foreign sovereigns
rather than passing or executing laws intended to regulate the citizenry); see also James Wilson’s
Summation and Final Rebuttal at the Pennsylvania Convention (Dec. 11, 1787), 1 THE DEBATE ON
THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 832, 844 (making the same point regarding treaties made in
Federalist No. 75).
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purest and most absolute form that they deemed practical, but the Federalists
had a broader view of practicality.
III. JAMES WILSON
A signer of both the Declaration of Independence and a sitting justice on
the first Supreme Court of the United States, James Wilson was one of the
leading voices at the Federal Convention and the lead framer of the 1790
Pennsylvania Constitution.75 He was well-versed in Montesquieu’s writings
and was a long-time defender of the separation of powers principle. As far
back as 1774, Wilson strenuously contended that when a single authority is
vested with all governing power, “liberty, like a structure of ice, would instantly
dissolve before the fire of oppression and despotick sway.”76 In Wilson’s view,
even in democratically elected governments, humans “may err” and “may
deviate from their duty,” making it necessary to counteract that with separate
institutions of power.77 He attributed the abuse of the American colonies in
part to the over-expansive concentration of power in the British Parliament.78
In examining Wilson’s philosophy, it is easy to view his political thought
as something of an enigma. Although his philosophical framework revolved
around his vision of popular sovereignty and he was widely regarded as one of
the most democratic prominent thinkers of his age, Wilson is said to have
supported outwardly counter-majoritarian ideas in framing the Constitution,
particularly those pertaining to separation of powers.79 Madison’s notes of
the Convention reveal, for instance, that Wilson was eager to place extensive
checks on the popularly elected House of Representatives, even more so than
the Constitution prescribed, as shown by his proposal for an absolute
executive veto on legislation.80

75

76

77
78
79
80

See generally, MADISON, supra note 26 (highlighting Wilson’s contributions at the Constitutional
Convention); 1 JAMES WILSON, James Wilson’s State House Yard Speech October 6, 1787, in
COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 171, 171–76 (Kermit L. Hall & Mark David Hall eds.,
2007) (highlighting Wilson’s contributions at the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention).
1 JAMES WILSON, Considerations on the Nature and Extent of the Legislative Authority of the British
Parliament (1774), in COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 75, at 3, 5. Mark Hall
notes that, in 1776, Wilson was a stern critic of Pennsylvania’s new constitution, in large part, because
of its “abolition of separated powers” the document afforded most of the power to a unicameral
legislature. HALL, supra note 10, at 15.
1 WILSON, supra note 76.
See id. (questioning the “supreme, irresistible, uncontrolled authority” that Great Britain possessed).
See HALL, supra note 76, at 146 (noting that Wilson viewed judicial review as “temporary
injunctions” rather than as a serious avenue to “thwart the majority”).
See MADISON, supra note 26, at 61. Wilson thought that “[t]he Executive ought to have an absolute
negative. Without such a self-defense the Legislature can at any moment sink it into non-existence.”
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From the independence debate to the ratification debate, many of
Wilson’s contemporaries attacked him on the public stage as an aristocrat. In
1776, for example, he was ousted from office after opposing the Pennsylvania
Constitution.81 Although it was intended to be very democratic in form,
Wilson objected to the Pennsylvania Constitution, in large part, because
power had been too concentrated in a single body, affording almost all of the
power to a unicameral legislature.82 The governing document, in essence,
failed to conform with the separation of powers principle. Despite the attacks
from his political adversaries, Wilson’s democratic principles were
fundamental to his political thought. At the Convention, for instance, he had
advocated for the direct election of the executive and both houses of Congress
to the great disapproval of most of the delegates.83 Overall, Wilson placed
great faith and confidence in the will of the majority, more so than arguably
any of his Federalist allies.
For Wilson, the proper objective of government is “to secure and to
enlarge the exercise of the natural rights of its members.”84 One that fails to
designate this effort as its number one priority “is not a government of the
legitimate kind.”85 Natural rights form the fundamental basis of Wilson’s
political thought.86 According to Wilson, natural rights derive from natural
law, which is prescribed by “our Creator.”87 The “will of God” is thus the
origin of moral obligation and the “only . . . source of superiority and
obligation.”88 As subordinates to God, “we are under the most perfect
obligation to obey that law.”89 It follows that the natural law is “universal”
and “immutable.”90 Wilson describes these “eternal” truths, passed down by
God, as “our constitution,” being supreme to all other sources of law.91
Therefore, human law, including the United States Constitution, must yield to
the natural law when they conflict according to Wilson. In other words, if a
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91

HALL, supra note 76, at 131.
Id. at 130.
See MADISON, supra note 26, at 41 (reasoning that this would help ensure that the branches would
remain “independent as possible of each other”).
2 JAMES WILSON, Of Crimes Against the Rights of Individuals Acquired Under Civil Government,
in COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 75, at 1060, 1061.

Id.
See 1 JAMES WILSON, Of the Law of Nature, in COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra
note 75, at 500 (discussing Wilson’s observations on the natural law).
Id. at 501.
Id. at 501, 508.
Id. at 500.
Id. at 523 (explaining that natural law, although immutable, may progress as the morals develop over
time).
See id. (arguing that the natural law is universal and cannot be diminished, altered, or abolished).
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law violates a guarantee of natural law, then it is not valid. Wilson believed
that the code of law passed down by mankind served as a means of conforming
to the law passed down by Providence.
In light of this, Wilson’s democratic principles were not the end
themselves. Rather, it was the means for preserving supreme natural rights
and realizing the virtue that it prescribes.92 Or, as Wilson put it, the objective
is a simple command: “Let man pursue his own perfection and happiness.”93
Naturally, democracy is the best fit for this end. A restrained government will,
of course, better enable individuals to seek these successfully and without
interference. Wilson’s historical and comparative analysis of governments
throughout the world demonstrate that other forms of government are more
prone to descending into tyranny to the detriment of God’s will.94
In his Lectures, Wilson explained that our moral perception is the guide
for discerning and implementing the natural law.95 He placed a significant
degree of trust in this faculty, referring to our notion of right and wrong as
“intuitively discerned.”96 The exercise of morality necessary for satisfying
God’s will does not require a formal education and most moral truths do not
require reasoning, as they are self-evident.97 Wilson recognized that
individuals’ moral sense is “diffused through every part of life” and begins to
unfold “in the first stages of life.”98 His faith in the people’s conscience
accounts for his constant adherence to the notion of popular sovereignty.
When majority rule prevails, natural law will not be contradicted because
the moral sense of the majority will be on the side of liberty.99 Therefore, the
more representative the government is of the majority of the population, the
more legitimate it will be.100 But Wilson acknowledged that this is not always

92

See HALL, supra note 76, at 146 (“Wilson advocated democratic institutions because he thought they

were most likely to legislate in accordance with natural law.”).
1 JAMES WILSON, Of the Law of Nature, in COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note
75, at 503.
94 1 JAMES WILSON, Of Government, in COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 75, at
689, 690.
95 See 1 JAMES WILSON, Of the Law of Nature, in COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra
note 75, at 500, 509 (“We have the same reason to rely on the dictates of [moral perception], as upon
the determinations of our senses, or of our other natural powers.”).
96 Id. at 512.
97 See id. at 513 (noting that the “cases that require reasoning are few”).
98 Id. at 510–11.
99 See Ralph Rossum, James Wilson and the “Pyramid of Government:” The Federal Republic, 6
POL. SCI. REVIEWER 113, 135 (1976) (emphasizing the importance of consent for Wilson’s political
philosophy).
100 See id. (“[Wilson] did not fear political power as long as it was in the hands of men to whom the
people had given their consent.”).
93
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the case and “there may be mistakes,” resulting in human laws that conflict
with natural law.101 Indeed, “[a]n indigested and inaccurate code of laws is one
of the most dangerous things that can be introduced into any government.”102
This exception to Wilson’s primary thought arguably accounts for instances
of his seemingly counter-majoritarian proposals. Sometimes, though rarely,
majority rule does not comport with natural law, the ultimate end of
government.
While some of Wilson’s proposals regarding the separation of powers are
seemingly contrary to his principle of popular sovereignty and are arguably
inconsistent in that regard, the premise of Wilson’s interpretation of
Montesquieu’s notion is that it furthers the natural law, thereby maintaining
consistency with the Constitution’s forefront objective. At the Constitutional
Convention, Wilson remarked that “[t]he separation of the departments does
not require that they should have separate objects but that they should act
separately tho’ on the same objects.”103 In the Lectures, he suggests that
independence means that the proceedings of each branch are not interfered
with, but their actions are subject to control once they are complete.104 This
suggests that his conception of the principle is similar to that of The Federalist
in theory. He believed that a significant degree of tension between the
executive, legislative, and judiciary powers was necessary to a certain extent.
However, his preferred application exhibits stark contrasts to what was
implemented in the final product, even in some cases resembling
Antifederalist preferences. Wilson’s proposals and stances regarding
legislative-revisionary power, the absolute veto, and the powers of the Senate
highlight the differences in his political thought with those of both sides of the
debate.

101 1 JAMES WILSON, Of the Law of Nature, in COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note
75, at 500, 510.
102 1 JAMES WILSON, Remarks of James Wilson in the Pennsylvania Convention to Ratify the
Constitution of the United States, 1787, in 1 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note
75, at 178, 205.
103 MADISON, supra note 26, at 299. Assuming that Madison’s records of the Convention are accurate
(there has been considerable debate on this), Madison’s notes are arguably a stronger source of
authority on Wilson’s preferences for government than his famous State House Yard Speech shortly
after the Convention had adjourned. Similar to The Federalist, which does not entirely reflect the
views of Hamilton and Madison, Wilson’s speech was a pitch for a document that he personally did
not agree with in its entirety (with respect to the ideas he proposed at the Convention). However,
Wilson did make certain concessions to the Antifederalist faction in the address.
104 1 JAMES WILSON, Of Government, in COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 75, at
689, 707.
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Overall, Wilson was the most outspoken democrat at the Convention,
advocating for the popular election of both houses of Congress and the
President.105 In doing so, “he wished that vigorous authority . . . flow
immediately from the legitimate source of all authority,” “the mind or sense
of the people at large.”106 Yet, some of his proposals for delegating powers
among the three branches of the Constitution were seen as contrary to the
whim of the majority. For instance, at the Convention, Wilson suggested that
the executive and judiciary branches both ought to have “[r]evisionary power”
for all legislation passed by Congress.107 In essence, this meant that Wilson
wanted to go beyond the notion of judicial review subscribed in Hamilton’s
Federalist No. 78, thereby connecting the branches to a greater degree. Many
delegates thought that the mixture was a step too far, fearing that it would
establish “an improper coalition between the Executive [and] Judiciary
departments.”108 Indeed, many delegates felt that judges ought to be “free from
the bias of having participated in [the law’s] formation.”109 But Wilson believed
that when laws, even those approved by the majority, are unjust or destructive
(or, in other words, violate natural law), the unelected judges ought to be able
to employ their wisdom to counteract them, even before the law is enacted
and executed.110 With regard to the question of law-making then, Wilson
urged that the branches be less separate and distinct from one another than
Antifederalists and most Federalists had deemed appropriate.
Wilson employed the same justification for his proposal for an absolute
executive veto. While the Convention ultimately agreed to grant the President
a partial negative that can be overturned by Congress, Wilson wanted to give
the President the final word.111 He warned that without this check, the three
branches could not remain distinct and independent, as “the Legislature
[could] at any moment sink [the executive] into non-existence.”112 According
to the notes, he was even willing to go as far as giving both the executive and

105 1 JAMES WILSON, Remarks of James Wilson in the Federal Convention, 1787, in COLLECTED
WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 75, at 80, 82, 85.
106 Id. at 90. Wilson believed that, despite different modes of choosing judges, representatives, and the
President, all official authority derives from the same source: the people. In that sense then, even
though federal judges are unelected, judicial interference in law-making is not contrary to majority
rule under Wilson’s framework.
107 Id. at 121.
108 Id. at 296.
109 Id. at 51.
110 See id. at 121–22 (providing Wilson’s argument for judicial revisionary power).
111 Id. at 88.
112 Id.
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judiciary departments a joint absolute negative.113 But Wilson believed that
the negative would rarely be used because Congress would almost always
refrain from passing laws that endanger liberty.114 However, the check was
nevertheless necessary to counter those rare instances.115 Although Wilson felt
that this would help ensure that the branches remain truly separate, he
preferred the powers to intermingle more than prescribed in the Federalist
and desired by most Antifederalists. At the Convention, delegates felt that an
absolute veto would give the President too much authority over the Legislature
and ultimately rejected Wilson’s proposal.116 Given Antifederalist criticism to
the limited veto,117 it can be inferred that most Antifederalists would object to
one individual being able to negate the whim of two legislative bodies without
recourse. In his fourth essay, for instance, the Impartial Examiner argued that
even the qualified negative was excessive because it afforded the President “a
weight [on the legislative scale of government] almost equal to that of two
thirds of the whole Congress.”118 This reasoning implies that an executive with
an absolute negative would, as the Impartial Examiner put it, “possess the
sovereignty of America.”119
However, for certain elements of governance, Wilson’s preferred
application of separation of powers was more on par with that of the
Antifederalists. As elaborated above, the opponents of the Constitution were
especially critical of the powers afforded to the Senate, insisting that the body
would be prone to abuses of power under the constitutional framework. To
an extent, Wilson agreed with them and he expressed concern about the

113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Id. This stance epitomizes Wilson’s primary political philosophy regarding the ends and means
of government, as explained by Mark Hall: In short, according to his Lectures, the end of government
is the preservation of and adherence to natural law while the means of achieving that is democratic
governance. HALL, supra note 10, at 146–47. While the democratic majority will almost always
conform to this end, Wilson recognized that there are sometimes extenuating circumstances that
require this absolute negative veto. Id.
116 See MADISON, supra note 26, at 52 (warning by Benjamin Franklin that, in Pennsylvania, “the
[absolute] negative of the Governor was constantly made use of to extort money”); see also THE
FEDERALIST NO. 73 (Alexander Hamilton) (explaining the advantages of a qualified negative over an
absolute one).
117 See 1 JAMES WILSON, Remarks of James Wilson in the Pennsylvania Convention to Ratify the
Constitution of the United States, 1787, in COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 75,
at 178, 230 (responding to the critique that the presidential veto afforded legislative power to the
executive and therefore violated separation of powers).
118 The Impartial Examiner IV, VA. INDEP. CHRON. (June 11, 1788), reprinted in THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION DIGITAL EDITION 2 (John P. Kaminski,
Gaspare J. Saladino, Richard Leffler, Charles H. Schoenleber & Margaret A. Hogan eds., 2009)
119 Id.
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Senate on multiple occasions. At the Convention, Gouverneur Morris argued
that it was wrong for the Senate to try judges for wrongdoing while filling the
vacancies that they created by removing them from the bench.120 Madison
noted that Wilson was of the same opinion for the same reasons.121 But, in
December 1787, Wilson was charged with defending the proposed
Constitution at the Pennsylvania Convention. He conceded, however, the
validity of the critique “that the powers of the several parts of [the] government
are not kept as distinct and independent as they ought to be.”122 Namely, he
stated that the powers of the Senate are not as separate as he would have
hoped.123 Indeed, he pointed out that, in this governmental framework, “the
distinction and independence of power is not adhered to with entire
theoretical precision.”124 While Wilson did not explicitly say which powers
he personally disagreed with, it can be reasonably inferred that the
combination of appointments and removal from office was one on his mind
given his concurrence with Morris. In the same address, he also discussed the
treaty power, which he referred to as “a blending of the legislative and
executive powers in the senate.”125 Wilson noticed the favorable and
unfavorable side of the power, but raised the question of whether “the
objectionable parts are of a sufficient weight to induce a rejection of this
constitution.”126 These remarks suggest that Wilson acknowledged the
objections to the blending because, to an extent, it concerned him as well.
Thus, while Wilson sympathized and likely agreed with certain aspects of
the Antifederalist position on separation of powers, he emphasized that the
Constitution’s distribution of power was an improvement over the Articles of
Confederation—which afforded nearly all federal power to a unicameral
legislature—and all of the state constitutions at the time.127 Despite the notable
defects of the Constitution, Wilson urged even the most strenuous objectors

120 MADISON, supra note 26, at 517.
121 Id.
122 James Wilson’s Summation and Final Rebuttal (Dec. 11, 1787), in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 832, 842.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 844.
126 Id.
127 See id. at 842–43 (surveying the defects of various state constitutions in this regard); see also 1 JAMES
WILSON, James Wilson’s State House Yard Speech (Oct. 6, 1787), in COLLECTED WORKS OF
JAMES WILSON, supra note 75, at 171, 176 (stating that “any thing nearer to perfection could not
have been accomplished”).
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to keep an open mind: “Let the experiment be made; let the system be fairly
and candidly tried, before it is determined that it cannot be executed.”128
CONCLUSION
During the ratification debate, varying applications of Montesquieu’s
maxim were proposed. Significant differences in the principle existed
between advocates and opponents of the Constitution and within the factions
as well. The Antifederalists generally argued for a stricter reading of
separation of powers, maintaining that the branches ought to be as distinct and
separate as possible, to the extent that it can be reconciled with a durable
government. Proponents of the Constitution differed with the Antifederalists’
sense of practicality. Some Federalists such as Wilson, however, disagreed
with numerous aspects of the final compromise. Differences in philosophical
outlook account for these differences. Wilson’s concept of a national
sovereign people was appropriated by Publius and the Federalists as a
springboard for abandoning the Articles of Confederation. However, Gordon
Wood has argued that the Federalist attachment to popular sovereignty was
disingenuous, “exploit[ing] the language that more rightfully belonged to their
opponents.”129 Wilson, however, as a general matter, was more sincere. The
Federalist expresses degrees of distrust in the people at large that Wilson’s
philosophy lacks.130 In light of this, it makes sense that Wilson did not share
the same degree of fondness towards the mixing of Senate and executive
powers as did Publius.131 He wanted more checks on the legislature, but he
was much warmer to the powers of the judiciary, advocating for broader
authority than the Constitution afforded to the third branch.132 A maverick of
political thought, Wilson was a devout nationalist, yet his general trust of
majority will more closely resembled Antifederalist thought. As applied
to separation of powers, his positions at both the Federal and Pennsylvania
128 James Wilson’s Summation and Final Rebuttal (Dec. 11, 1787), in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE
CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 832, 838.
129 GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at 562 (1998).
130 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (discussing the dangers of an “overbearing
majority”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 55 (Alexander Hamilton or James Madison) (“[T]here is a degree
of depravity in mankind which requires a certain degree of circumspection and distrust . . . .”).
131 See William Ewald, James Wilson and the Drafting of the Constitution, 10 J. CONST. L. 901, 976
(2008) (explaining that “[Wilson’s] trust in the good sense of the people was not matched by an equal
trust in their elected representatives”); see also id. at 978 (pointing out that Wilson’s priority was the
representation of individuals while Madison’s priority was the representation of interests).
132 See, e.g., 1 JAMES WILSON, Remarks of James Wilson in the Federal Convention (1787), in
COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON, supra note 75, at 80, 121 (advocating for a revisionary
power for the Judiciary).
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conventions ranged across the span of the debate, many surpassing the checks
put into effect by the Constitution and some approaching the degree of
separation preferred by his opposition.133 In essence, while Wilson’s
democratic priorities were arguably more in line with those of the
Antifederalists, his methods of achieving them led him to the Federalist cause.
His positions, in relation to those of his contemporaries, reveal complexities
in the principle of separation of powers. His ultimate goals for the new
government differed from those of Madison and Hamilton in numerous ways,
but his way of implementing them were largely in harmony with the Federalist
ideology.

133

See id. at 88 (proposing an absolute executive veto). But see James Wilson’s Summation and Final
Rebuttal (Dec. 11, 1787), in 1 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 4, at 832, 842
(explaining that the Senate is not as separate as Wilson would have liked it to be as designed).

